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When we talk of legal scholarship, we ordinarily mean law review articles,
university press books, and similar publications. But those are far from the only
outlets for a scholar’s research and opinions. Many legal scholars write briefs,
comments on agency action, popular press books, opinion pieces, and other
works that are aimed at a wider audience.1 Legal scholars also maintain blogs,
post on Twitter, testify before legislatures and other policy bodies, and give
statements to the press. From time to time, law professors have questioned
what professional norms ought to apply when scholars engage in these nonscholarly activities.
In this short symposium contribution, I offer some tentative thoughts on
what professional norms ought to apply to law professors who engage in a nowpopular form of public discourse: Twitter. Specifically, I suggest that law
professors should assume that, each time they tweet about a legal issue, they
are making an implicit claim to expertise about that issue. I also suggest that
when law professors participate on Twitter, they should do so in a fashion that
models the sort of reasoned debate that we teach law students.
* Anne Shea Ransdell and William Garland “Buck” Ransdell, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law,
University of North Carolina School of Law. I am indebted to Brian Frye, Erica Goldberg, Rachel
Gurvich, David Herzig, Andy Hessick, John Inazu, Micahel Kagan, Anthony Kreis, Alex Kreit, Orin
Kerr, Michael Morley, and Alexandra Roberts for their helpful comments on this Essay.
1. Some have argued that these other, non-traditional outlets for legal research and opinion
should also “count” towards their professional obligation to produce scholarship—a debate that I do
not take up here. Of course, in calling these works “non-scholarship,” I am tipping my hand that I
personally do not think that they “count” as the scholarship that we have a professional obligation to
produce.
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One might legitimately question the value of discussing Twitter in a
symposium devoted to legal scholarship.2 With its rigid character limits and
focus on “hot takes,”3 Twitter is arguably the antithesis of scholarship.4 And
yet there is little doubt that Twitter has an increasingly important role in public
discourse and legal discourse in particular. There have been a number of
exchanges criticizing how some law professors use the Twitter platform.5
Nevertheless, I think that there is value in law professors participating on
Twitter, and thus it is worth discussing whether, as a profession, legal
academics ought to endorse or criticize certain behavior on Twitter.6

2. Indeed, one might legitimately question the value of law professor participation on Twitter.
Many law professors do not participate on Twitter. And those of us that do, often question the value
of the medium and the wisdom of our decision to participate in it. See sources cited infra note 69.
3. A “take” is an opinion or a point of view. A “hot take” is a quickly expressed view, ordinarily
based
on
simplistic
reasoning.
See
Hot
take,
URBAN
DICTIONARY ,
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=hot+take [https://perma.cc/VD6Y-JSEM] (last
visited Dec. 20, 2017) (defining “hot take” as an “opinion based on simplistic moralizing rather than
actual thought”).
4. “Twitter . . . is heavily frequented by legal academics, but often does not foster or even allow
for circumspect, reasoned, dispassionate analysis.” Erica Goldberg, What Makes a (Legal) Academic?,
IN A CROWDED THEATER (Dec. 17, 2017), https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2017/12/17/what-makes-alegal-academic/#more-2922 [https://perma.cc/3GYA-B42K].
5. See, e.g., Joseph Bernstein, Why Is A Top Harvard Law Professor Sharing Anti-Trump
Conspiracy
Theories?,
BUZZFEED
(May
11,
2017,
3:18
PM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/josephbernstein/larry-tribewhy?utm_term=.grXZZbmD3x#.evg44DXKR7 [https://perma.cc/L6A7-KPL6] (criticizing Professor
Laurence Tribe for his Twitter activity).
6. Professor Erica Goldberg also recently called for a development of professional norms for law
professors on Twitter:
Twitter, a medium which I also use, is heavily frequented by legal academics, but
often does not foster or even allow for circumspect, reasoned, dispassionate
analysis. Overly partisan tweets outside of an academic’s area or bickering, with
other professors or the general public, are unbecoming facets of Twitter. Tweets
designed to simply cleverly express a view . . . already held by one’s followers,
for the purpose of ossifying positions, seem at direct odds with the academic
pursuit. Professors are people too, but when our Twitter accounts are connected
to our status as professor, lines are blurred, and academic credibility is lost. (I’m
honestly not sure what the solution to that problem is, and of course we shouldn’t
be restricting professors’ use of Twitter, but perhaps promoting better norms. I
am guilty of “like-seeking” behavior.)
Goldberg, supra note 4.
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A. Scholarly Norms for Non-Scholarship
The idea that non-scholarship ought to be subject to scholarly norms is not
new. There are several law review articles on the topic.7 In 1999, Neal Devins
and Cass Sunstein had a debate about the law professor letter that was submitted
to Congress opposing the impeachment of President Bill Clinton.8 Ward
Farnsworth wrote an article a few years later that dealt more generally with the
practice of law professors “sign[ing] their names to amicus briefs, letters, and
petitions addressed to courts and other decision-makers considering questions
of public interest . . . .”9 More recently, Richard Fallon and Amanda Frost took
different views on the appropriateness of law professors signing amicus briefs
that include language and arguments for which they cannot personally vouch.10
This scholarship can be roughly divided into two camps: Those who think
that ordinary norms of scholarship apply (at least in some form) to nonscholarship, and those who think that different norms ought to apply.11 The
“same norms” view emphasizes the reputational and institutional harm to the
legal academy that non-scholarship can cause. Implicit in this view is the idea
that law professors ought to remain silent if their statements would fall
significantly short of the scholarly ideal.12 The “different norms” view rests on
the ideas that law professors have a role to play in the non-academic resolution

7. There is also plenty of non-scholarly writing on the topic. See, e.g., Michael I. Krauss, The
Law Professors’ Scandalous Statement Against Jeff Sessions, FORBES: #THEVERDICT (Jan. 5, 2017,
11:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelkrauss/2017/01/05/the-law-professors-scandalousstatement-against-jeff-sessions/#7f3d9c495a72 [https://perma.cc/MGL4-3KYF]; Eric Segall, Writing
About Law in an Avalanche: What is a Scholar to Do?, DORF ON LAW (Nov. 1, 2017),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/11/writing-about-law-in-avalanche-what-is.html?m=1
[https://perma.cc/FL45-G8MK]; Ilya Somin, The Ethics of Law Professor Amicus Briefs, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 29, 2011, 9:06 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/10/29/the-ethics-of-law-professoramicus-briefs [https://perma.cc/AS4B-4F5C].
8. Neal Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future of Academic
Freedom, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 171–73 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Professors and Politics, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 191, 192–98 (1999).
9. Ward Farnsworth, Talking Out of School: Notes on the Transmission of Intellectual Capital
From the Legal Academy to Public Tribunals, 81 B.U. L. REV. 13, 13–14 (2001).
10. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Scholars’ Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Professor, 4 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 223, 227 (2012); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Scholars’ Briefs: A Response to Richard
Fallon, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 135, 139 (2013).
11. Compare Devins, supra note 8, at 189–90 (arguing that law professors should only
participate in partisan politics when they have a substantial amount of knowledge akin to professional
norms), with Sunstein, supra note 8, at 195–96 (suggesting a less stringent standard).
12. See Devins, supra note 8, at 189–90.
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of important issues13 and that law, as a field, is not distinct from politics.14
These differences suggest that the authors of these articles may disagree not
only about whether scholarship norms ought to apply to non-scholarship, but
also about the precise nature of scholarship norms themselves.
I find value in both camps. On the one hand, each time that we identify
ourselves as law professors when making a public statement about legal issues,
we ought to be mindful that such statements obviously include a claim to
authority. That is to say, if a person identifies herself as a law professor, she is
making a claim to be an expert—someone who deserves to be taken seriously,
if not to receive deference—that is independent from the content of any
particular statement that she makes.15 We should also be aware that our public
statements about legal issues often reflect on the legal academy as a whole.16
On the other hand, I think that there is real value in law professors engaging
with the courts, the political branches, and the broader public.17 Although law
and politics are distinct fields,18 legal knowledge and expertise can be quite
useful to the resolution of some political questions. And when we make
statements to non-legal or non-academic audiences, I think it is acceptable (if
not preferable) to omit at least some of the nuance and complexity that would
13. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 200 (“[I]t is perfectly responsible, maybe even a civic duty,
for law professors to participate in public affairs, at least some of the time, by showing how what they
know bears on public issues.”).
14. See Frost, supra note 10, at 144–47 (arguing that “the ‘best’ or ‘correct’ legal result
sometimes cannot be separated entirely, or even significantly, from political or ideological
preferences” and arguing that “ideology should play a significant role in resolving close legal
questions”).
15. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1936 (2008) (“Like
parents and judges of higher courts, those who are in authority typically rely, or at least can rely, on
their role or position to provide reasons for their subjects to follow their rules, commands, orders, or
instructions.”).
16. As Ward Farnsworth has explained, “[W]hen a legal academic takes a position in public and
identifies himself as a ‘law professor,’ he is trading on the equivalent of a trademark in that title,” and
if some academics use the title in situations where they do not actually possess expertise, then
“consumers of academic opinions” will not be able to tell whether a given law professor is an expert
or not, leading to “consumer confusion or dilution of the ‘law professor’ mark.” Farnsworth, supra
note 9, at 17–19.
17. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 200–01.
18. “Law is not politics. When law and politics are seen as indistinguishable, then the legal
arguments of law professors can be dismissed as nothing more than fig leaves for preferred political
outcomes. I’ve seen far too much of that recently, and I think law professors should do all that they
can to resist that view.” Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ideological Diversity and Party Affiliation,
PRAWFSBLAWG
(June
17,
2017,
4:11
PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/06/ideological-diversity-and-party-affiliation.html
[https://perma.cc/2T23-WLVL].
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appear in a work of legal scholarship. In short, I think that the legal academy
ought to adhere to professional norms when engaging in non-scholarship, but
those norms are less demanding than the norms governing scholarship.
Before proceeding further, it is important to be clear about what I mean by
“norms.” I do not mean that law professors should somehow be forbidden from
saying certain things on Twitter. A norm is different than a prohibition. A
norm is a standard of behavior that is desired or expected. A single person
cannot set a norm for a group; the group would have to agree, at least implicitly,
on the appropriate standard. So what I am proposing here is that law professors,
as a group, come to a consensus about how we, as a group, ought to behave on
Twitter.
B. Twitter and the Dissemination of Ideas
There are a number of reasons that a law professor might want to post on
Twitter.19 As compared to the other platforms available to law professors,
Twitter has distinct advantages as a method of communication with other law
professors and with the public more generally. Twitter allows law professors
to broaden the reach of their ideas, increase their professional profiles, and
communicate more easily and more quickly than other media.
A law professor who wants to communicate an idea to other law professors
has several options. She can publish that idea in a law review article or an
academic press book. This process takes a long time, not only because writing
those manuscripts involves a lot of time and effort, but also because it takes a
significant amount of time, after a manuscript is complete, for it to appear in
print. Consequently, a law professor who has an idea about a timely topic may
find that her idea is obsolete (or no longer of public interest) by the time it is
published. It is also uncertain how many people will read a professor’s law
review article or academic book. Because law review articles are quite long,
readership may be limited to those who are researching the same topic.20 To be
sure, a law review article published in an elite law journal is likely to be more
widely read. But a professor has little control over where her manuscript is
published.
The professor can attempt to communicate her idea to other law professors
by speaking at academic conferences or faculty workshops. But many
19. See generally Chris Walker, Is There Any Reason Not to Be on Twitter (Jr. Law Prawfs
FAQ),
PRAWFSBLAWG,
(April
20,
2016,
9:03
AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/04/is-there-any-reason-not-to-be-on-twitter.html
[https://perma.cc/9SUK-DLWD].
20. Readership for academic press books may be even lower. Not only are they longer, but they
are not included in the Westlaw and LEXIS databases that most law professors use for their research.
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conferences and workshops are by invitation only. Whether one receives an
invitation to such a conference may depend on the strength of one’s personal
connections to the organizer or whether one is already considered a “big name”
in the field—issues over which most law professors have limited control. Not
all conferences require invitations; some have open calls for papers. But the
panel attendance at those conferences can be quite low. And even if a professor
is lucky enough to have a large audience at a conference, conference attendance
is expensive. Thus, there are limits to the number of conferences that a
professor is likely to attend in a given year.
Technology has made the communication of ideas within the academy
somewhat easier. Law professors are able to post their manuscripts on the
Social Science Research Network (SSRN) or other repositories. This allows
professors to disseminate their manuscripts almost as soon as they are finished
writing, thus eliminating the time lag associated with publication.21 The title
and abstract of those manuscripts are emailed to other professors through
digests or e-journals every few weeks. Thus, more people may learn that a
professor has written on a particular topic.22
Law professors can also communicate their ideas by blogging. A blog post
is usually short, and therefore takes less time to write than an article or a book.
Law professors also have the ability to make a blog post immediately available.
This short time lag between when the law professor has the idea and when she
makes it publicly available makes blog posts a good medium for law professors
to disseminate their time-sensitive ideas.
Although blogging allows for quick communication, blogging is not
necessarily a good medium for ensuring that an idea is widely disseminated.
There is no guarantee that other professors will see, let alone read, a blog post.
Blog posts are not searchable in the Westlaw and LEXIS databases that most
law professors use for their research. Nor can a law professor depend on SSRN
or another platform to disseminate her blog posts to a wider audience. She must
either join an established law professor blog or start her own blog and try to get
other law professors to visit her blog’s website. The law professor has only

21. Those postings may be complicated by copyright concerns. See Howard Wasserman, SSRN
Postings
and
Copyright,
PRAWFSBLAWG
(July
15,
2016,
1:16
PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/07/ssrn-postings-and-copyright.html
[https://perma.cc/MND5-JNYR] (reporting that SSRN was removing law professors’ papers from the
site over copyright concerns).
22. Whether those additional people take the time to read the full article is a separate question.
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limited control over whether her blog post will get a lot of traffic, and it can be
quite difficult to increase that traffic.23
Unsurprisingly, it is easier for a law professor to disseminate her ideas
within the legal academy if she enjoys a strong professional reputation. A
professor with a strong professional reputation is likely to get more citations to
her scholarship and receive more conference invitations.24 She is more likely
to be invited to join an established blog; and if she chooses to start her own
blog, the site is likely to receive a significant amount of traffic. But a professor
who is looking to develop a strong professional reputation must do so largely
by trying to disseminate her ideas. This creates a Catch-22, especially for junior
faculty or faculty outside of the most elite law schools: They want to
disseminate their ideas widely in order to develop a good professional
reputation, but not already having such a reputation hampers their ability to
disseminate their ideas widely.
A law professor who wants to communicate her ideas outside of the
academy is even more limited by her existing professional reputation, and she
has even fewer options both to communicate her ideas and to increase her
reputation. She can try to publish op-eds or popular press books. But it is much
more difficult to publish in those venues than it is to publish in law reviews or
with academic presses: manuscripts are not blind-reviewed, and thus authors
who already have strong reputations are more likely to be published. The
professor can speak with reporters and try to get quoted in a news article or to
make an appearance on radio or television. But media calls are usually initiated
by the journalist, rather than by the expert. Law professors who do not already
have national profiles are less likely to receive those calls. And even if a
professor wanted to be proactive and reach out to journalists herself, professors
often don’t know which reporters are writing stories that might be relevant to
the idea the professor wants to communicate.
Twitter makes the communication of ideas both inside and outside of the
academy much easier.25 Twitter allows professors to offer their opinions
quickly and in an easily digested format. Because tweets have character limits,
23. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Public Face of Scholarship, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1201, 1217–
18 (2006) (noting the difficulty of academic bloggers in reaching large audiences).
24. Stanley Fish has argued in favor of a system that benefits academics with good reputations;
after all, those academics produced the high-quality scholarship that gave rise to those reputations. See
Stanley Fish, Guest Column, No Bias, No Merit: The Case against Blind Submission, 103 MOD.
LANGUAGE ASS’N 739, 739–40, 744–45 (1988). But sometimes those reputations linger long after a
professor has ceased to contribute high quality scholarship, and their repeated inclusion at conferences
and symposia crowd out newer voices, keeping the next generation of professors from creating their
own good reputations.
25. My thinking on the benefits of Twitter was greatly informed by Chris Walker’s blog post
encouraging law professors to use the platform. See Walker, supra note 19.

HESSICK 101 MARQ L REV (4) (PDF) (REVISED 6.20.18).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

910

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

6/20/18 7:11 PM

[101:903

they allow professors to express an opinion on a topic without expending the
time required to write something longer, like an academic article or a blog post.
And the character limits of tweets allow readers to read and understand an idea
far more quickly than if they had to read a book, a law review article, or even a
blog post. This allows readers to expose themselves to a greater number of
ideas in a shorter period of time.
Twitter also allows professors to offer their opinions on their own initiative.
A professor who wants to comment on a newsworthy topic need not wait for a
reporter to call her. Twitter allows law professors to reach a national audience
at the click of a mouse. What is more, an idea or an opinion offered on Twitter
can come to the attention of a journalist writing on the topic. While journalists
are unlikely to read law review articles or even law professor blogs, they often
search Twitter. And so a tweet may lead to media opportunities, such as quotes
in newspaper articles or appearances on television shows, which will increase
an academic’s professional profile.
Twitter also makes it easier for law professors to communicate with other
law professors. Many law professors are on Twitter,26 and it is easy to interact
with other professors by commenting on their posts or jumping into
“conversations” that other professors are already having. Indeed, it appears that
this behavior is expected, even between professors who have never met each
other before. Twitter thus enables professors to increase their professional
network without having to travel to conferences.
The Twitter platform not only allows professors to more easily disseminate
their ideas, it also gives professors more information about how many people
have seen their idea, as well as who agrees or disagrees with the idea.
Ordinarily, law professors have to wait for years in order to assess whether their
ideas have had an impact. The methods for assessing that impact are crude and
obviously imperfect.27 And many of us have, at least on occasion, worried
26. I do not have a head count of the law professors on Twitter. But Bridget Crawford’s periodic
“Census of Law Professor Twitter Users” indicates that the number is increasing at a steady rate.
Compare Bridget Crawford, Census of Law Professor Twitter Users Version 3.0, FACULTY LOUNGE
(Jan. 23, 2015, 7:44 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/01/census-of-law-professor-twitterusers-version-30.html [https://perma.cc/2KBK-4CKP] (identifying 553 law professors on Twitter),
with Bridget Crawford, Census of Law Professor Twitter Users Version 2.0, FACULTY LOUNGE (July
26, 2012, 5:55 PM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2012/07/census-of-law-professor-twitter-usersversion-20.html [https://perma.cc/J9W3-WGQN] (identifying 204 law professors on Twitter).
27. These methods for assessing impact include citation count surveys and informal feedback
from peers. See Fish, supra note 24, at 739; see also Adam Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews That
Lawyers Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2013, at A15. The former are both widely consumed and
widely reviled. I assume that the latter occurs infrequently given the expressions of shock and gratitude
that I’ve received from other law professors when I tell them that I have read one of their articles.
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about whether anyone is actually reading the law review articles that we write.28
Twitter allows professors to track how often their tweets are shared
(“retweeted”) by others, how many users express approval of their tweets
(“likes”), and even how many people see their tweets (“impressions”). And
because Twitter allows other users to instantaneously comment on tweets, it
also gives professors the ability to further defend or refine their ideas in real
time.
C. Twitter’s Virtues as Vices
By now I have established that there are a number of reasons why a law
professor would want to express ideas on Twitter. But the very features of
Twitter that make it a good vehicle for expressing ideas are also its most
problematic features for academics.
Take, for example, the ability of a professor to express an opinion easily on
Twitter. One of the defining features of academic scholarship is that it is the
product of considerable time and effort.29 Tweeting, as compared to writing
traditional scholarship, takes almost no time or effort. This makes Twitter an
attractive venue for expressing ideas. Avoiding the time and effort associated
with legal scholarship allows a professor to communicate more ideas, to
communicate ideas more quickly, and to communicate those ideas in the
context of a particular newsworthy event. But eliminating the time and effort
associated with legal scholarship has other, quite negative consequences.
Twitter is not designed to highlight or encourage effort. Unlike longer
formats, such as law review articles and blog posts, an idea expressed in a tweet
is unlikely to contain much in the way of reasoning. Tweets are conclusory.
To be sure, some professors may be offering ideas on Twitter that they have
explained more fully elsewhere. Professors often use the platform to alert other
professors to their scholarship and blog posts.30 But the shortened format of
Twitter encourages professors to present the most streamlined version of their
ideas—to cut to the chase of their conclusion and to leave out the long and
28. Cf. Liptak, supra note 27 (claiming that “43 percent of law review articles have never been
cited in another article or in a judicial decision”).
29. The Draft Principles of Scholarly Ethics defines “Legal Scholarship” as published works
that, inter alia, “are the product of significant effort and professional expertise.” This feature is
reflected in the norm of “exhaustiveness” included in the Draft Principles of Scholarly Ethics. Draft
Principles of Scholarly Ethics, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 897 (2018).
30. See Michael Risch, Why Tweet? (Plus Some New and Better Data), FACULTY LOUNGE (Feb.
2, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/02/why-tweet-plus-some-new-and-betterdata.html [https://perma.cc/QL2L-R52S] (presenting data suggesting that many law professors use
Twitter to promote their scholarship, conference appearances, and other professional activities).
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messy analysis that supports it. And so what is offered on Twitter may
transform legal scholarship into something unrecognizable.31
What is worse, the shortened format may also distort ideas. Because of the
shortened format, professors must make choices about what information to
highlight, what information to omit, and what information to treat superficially.
Space constraints may create incentives for professors to treat an idea
superficially—particularly ideas with which they disagree. Law professors
may present oversimplified versions of others’ arguments and then respond to
that simple version rather than a more complete, or more nuanced version of
the other person’s argument. This tendency to oversimplify may transform
substantive disagreements between academics into little more than virtual
shouting matches.
Twitter’s shortened format also encourages professors to share ideas that
are not fully formed or vetted. Because it is so easy to communicate ideas on
Twitter, professors will often present ideas on Twitter for the first time.
Precisely because the barriers to communicating an idea are so low, those who
use Twitter will often use the platform to make statements that they would never
make in other contexts—statements well outside of their areas of expertise, or
statements that they have spent no more time thinking about than the time it
took to type them. It is the process of reasoning that forms the core of most
legal analysis.32 And it is reasoning (rather than just our conclusions) that
separates academics from non-academics.33 Thus, if a professor tweets
casually—without reflection or depth of knowledge—then she is using the
platform in a way that does not help her communicate her ideas as an academic.
The ability to tweet casually is especially attractive when it comes to
newsworthy topics. Twitter allows those who have expertise on a topic to
disseminate their ideas when that topic is timely. For example, it could allow
an expert on federal court jurisdiction to express an opinion on the merits of a
newly issued Supreme Court case about mootness. But Twitter does not
31. Professors sometimes tie together multiple tweets into “threads.” But such “tweet storms”
are still significantly shorter than a typical blog post.
32. Law professors and judges sometimes refer to this concept as whether they are able to “write
out” an idea. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr. & Benjamin Wittes, Of Clerks and Perks, ATLANTIC
(July/Aug.
2006),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/of-clerks-andperks/304959/ [https://perma.cc/8BHQ-UTPX] (“John Paul Stevens, the only justice who habitually
writes his own first drafts, once told the journalist Tony Mauro: ‘Part of the reason [I write my own
drafts] is for self-discipline . . . I don’t really understand a case until I write it out.’” (alterations in
original)). If a law professor or judge is unable to write down the analysis that supports her idea, then
the assumption is that the idea may not be correct.
33. Cf. Devins, supra note 8, at 186 (stating that “it is the reasoning of academics—not the
conclusions they reach—which justifies academic freedom”).
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distinguish between those law professors with expertise on a topic and those
without. A Twitter user is given the same opportunity to express an opinion on
a topic about which she has written a multi-volume treatise as is given to a user
who has never thought about a topic before that very moment. How widely
those opinions end up being disseminated will depend on how many
“followers” a professor has and on how many other users choose to “retweet”
that opinion. And, unfortunately, one rarely gains large numbers of followers
or garners large numbers of retweets by offering sober, nuanced analysis. Pithy
generalizations and partisan fodder are more likely to generate interest and
followers.34
Leaving aside the problem of expertise, the ability to comment quickly on
newsworthy topics creates problems for the formation of a law professor’s
ideas. In scholarship, professors ordinarily offer their ideas as general
principles that have been adopted after considerable reflection.35 This helps to
ensure both that the ideas remain relevant and that the professor is committed
to the principle as a principle. Because the process of writing and publishing
scholarship takes so long, a professor will publish an idea only after
considerable reflection.36 In contrast, a law professor’s tweets on noteworthy
events do not require generally applicable principles. Professors can offer an
opinion on a particular event—such as an opinion on whether a particular
government action is constitutional—without having to articulate or defend a
generally applicable principle. Because a professor is expressing an opinion
only about this particular instance, the opinion may have been influenced by
her intuitions or preferences about the outcome of that particular case. That is
to say, it might reflect a political or personal preference rather than a considered
legal opinion.37
34. For a trenchant analysis of the social dynamics at play on Twitter and how they influence
journalists on the platform, see Damon Linker, Twitter is Destroying America, WEEK (June 2, 2017),
https://theweek.com/articles/702389/twitter-destroying-america [https://perma.cc/79H4-42PU].
35. Cf. Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions—A Research Agenda
with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 598 (1999) (“‘[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them,’ whether they are
executive officials or judges. And one task of legal scholarship is to help courts translate vague, general
statutory or constitutional language into rules that set forth somewhat more ‘explicit standards.’”)
(alteration in original) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
36. See Draft Principles of Scholarly Ethics, supra note 29 (referring to the norm of
“exhaustiveness”).
37. To be clear, I think that legal academics often overvalue a commitment to principles; the
entire premise of a common law system is that contextual decision making has significant value. But,
at the same time, there is a difference between saying that the appropriate resolution of an issue can
(and should) depend on the context, and saying that there is no difference between one’s legal opinions
and one’s political opinions.
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Perhaps most importantly, if a professor is using Twitter in order to express
an idea on a noteworthy topic, then she is using the platform in order to avoid
the time lag that would ordinarily provide an opportunity for reflection. Like
most law professors, I have often changed my mind about legal opinions after
reflection. Not only does Twitter not reward such reflection, it may actually
discourage it. The news cycle on Twitter is incredibly short, and those who
tweet about an issue first often receive the most attention. Thus, Twitter
encourages and rewards those professors who offer opinions quickly, rather
than those who leave themselves time for reflection.
The increased control that Twitter gives over one’s opportunities to increase
professional reputation can also be problematic. Although the traditional
scholarship model does not give professors much control over their professional
reputations,38 the little control a law professor does have is over the quality of
her scholarship.39 For most people, high-quality scholarship requires
significant reflection and great depth of knowledge. Twitter rewards the
opposite. Professors build a large Twitter following by tweeting often and by
tweeting on noteworthy topics.40 But tweeting often and quickly on noteworthy
topics is likely to lead a person to tweet without reflection or without depth of
knowledge. In other words, Twitter allows professors more control over their
professional reputation, but it does so by inverting the incentives of traditional
scholarship. A professor who published law review articles on current events
and without reflection would be mocked; but a professor who tweets in such a
manner will likely be rewarded by a large Twitter following.
Professors who decide to tweet without reflection and to tweet on
newsworthy events also appear sometimes to forget that the platform is public.41
38. Efforts should be made to change that.
39. I distinguish between the actual quality of a law professor’s scholarship and the external
markers of quality—such as law review placement and citation counts. Professors have significant
control over the former and limited control over the latter.
40. See Michael Risch, How Law Professors Use Twitter, FACULTY LOUNGE (Jan. 27, 2015,
6:30
AM),
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/01/how-law-professors-use-twitter.html
[https://perma.cc/R42J-F5CK] (showing that those law professors who have more followers tweet
more; “The cause and effect is likely symbiotic, but it does reflect something I’ve read about for other
social media, like blogging: knowing you have readers creates pressure to produce more content.”).
To be sure, some professors’ large Twitter followings may be attributable to reputations that they have
established outside of the platform, such as by running a popular blog or appearing on television.
41. As Eric Posner notes:
In the non-virtual world, successful people take care to keep up impressions, for
example, they avoid making controversial statements to friends, colleagues, and
strangers except when unavoidable, and even then do so in a carefully respectful
way. [But on] Twitter, the same people act as if their audience consisted of a few
like-minded friends and forget that it actually consists of a diverse group of
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For example, many professors are quite careful to conduct their classes in an
even-handed and non-partisan manner. But those same professors may express
opinions on Twitter about purely political issues with no apparent connection
to law, opinions can be (and often are) seen by their students.42 These tweets
can send a clear signal to students about the political affiliations and views of
their professors, undermining the professors’ classroom efforts to present an
even-handed and non-partisan image in the classroom.
That Twitter makes it easy for professors to track the impact of their tweets
makes its skewed incentives all the more salient. A pithy comment on a timely
topic is more likely to be widely “retweeted” and “liked” than a sensible and
nuanced tweet on a purely legal topic.43 When professors see this dynamic—
when they are rewarded for the pithy and the timely—it encourages professors
to tweet more of the same.44 Indeed, Eric Posner has pointed out that Twitter
appears to have changed its algorithms so that they make pithy and timely—
i.e., non-academic—tweets more likely to be read.45
Even Twitter’s ability to facilitate communications between law professors
has its downsides. Twitter’s quick communication sometimes allows
professors to refine their ideas more efficiently. But the ability to communicate
quickly sometimes leads professors to communicate rudely. Time for reflection
doesn’t just help professors refine their ideas, it also gives them time to cool off
and couch their disagreement with peers in polite (or at least professional)
terms. I am sorry to say that I have witnessed more than one professor whom I
otherwise admire behave very rudely on Twitter. And because Twitter is a
constantly available platform, it allows people to tweet when they are tired,
angry, or otherwise not their best selves. This probably makes unprofessional
behavior far more likely.

people who may not agree with them in every particular . . . . Without realizing
it, people who use Twitter damage the image of themselves that they cultivate in
the non-virtual world.
Eric Posner, Twenty Theses About Twitter, ERIC POSNER (July 3, 2017), http://ericposner.com/twentytheses-about-twitter/ [https://perma.cc/X4SR-U998].
42. Forgetting that students can see their tweets raises problems not only about tweets that
express political preferences, but also about tweets that address other aspects of teaching. There are
tweets that complain about grading or about student behavior—and one wonders whether professors
who tweet such sentiments do so with the idea that their students can see these tweets in mind.
43. See Posner, supra note 41 (“[T]he most effective tweet is a clever formulation of a view that
everyone already believes. If one lacks cleverness, forcefulness provides a second best.”).
44. See Posner, supra note 41 (“People send tweets with a single overriding purpose: to get the
tweet “liked” or retweeted. . . . When your tweet is liked or retweeted, you enjoy a dopamine surge.”).
45. Eric Posner, The Worthy Tweet, ERIC POSNER (March 3, 2018), http://ericposner.com/theworthy-tweet/ [https://perma.cc/3LQS-ZGNF].

HESSICK 101 MARQ L REV (4) (PDF) (REVISED 6.20.18).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

916

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

6/20/18 7:11 PM

[101:903

I should note that I am personally guilty of many of the Twitter vices that I
have identified. I have tweeted outside of my area of expertise; I have allowed
newsworthiness to eclipse rigorous analysis and reflection; and I have
sometimes tweeted in an intemperate tone. The fact that the Twitter platform
facilitates, and at times incentivizes such behavior is not an excuse for what
I’ve done. But I do tend to think that, to the extent more law professors exhibit
this behavior on Twitter, the behavior is likely to increase. Indeed, the legal
literature on norms suggests that our behavior is, in many respects, influenced
by the behavior we see in our environments more than by legal prohibitions.46
Thus, if more law professors were to eschew the vices of Twitter—if, as a
profession, we were to develop informal social norms to counteract the
incentives of the platform—then we could see a real positive change in how
law professors behave on Twitter.
D. Suggested Norms for Law Professors on Twitter
Twitter provides law professors with an easily accessible public platform.
Participating on Twitter allows a law professor to share her ideas and increase
her professional profile more easily than publishing traditional scholarship and
attending conferences. But a law professor’s participation on Twitter isn’t
necessarily limited to shaping a law professors individual public image; the law
professor’s participation can also shape public perception of law professors as
a group.
To be clear, not everything that a professor does necessarily reflects on the
academy as a whole. If a law professor tweets about a sporting event,47
complains about the state of public transit in her city, or tweets about some
other relatively mundane issue that has nothing to do with the law,48 then her
tweets are unlikely to have an effect on the reputation of the legal academy as
a whole.49 But when professors tweet about legal issues, or when they tweet
false and incendiary information from Twitter accounts that identify them as
law professors, then their behavior on the platform may reflect not only on them
as individuals, but also on the legal academy as a whole.50
46. See generally RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND
LIMITS (2015); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
47. I had no idea how many law professors were Philadelphia Eagles fans.
48. Larry Ribstein called this sort of public writing by academics “recreational expression.”
Ribstein, supra note 23, at 1202.
49. But, as discussed below, the manner in which those tweets are framed may raise other
problems.
50. See Goldberg, supra note 4 (“Professors are people too, but when our Twitter accounts are
connected to our status as professor, lines are blurred, and academic credibility is lost.”); see also supra
notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
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Because law professors’ tweets may affect public perception of law
professors as a group, we, as a group, should work to develop norms associated
with law professor participation on Twitter. Indeed, we should work to develop
norms associated with all types of non-scholarship public discourse, including
op-eds,51 legislative testimony,52 and amicus briefs.53 But this short essay is
focused on Twitter.
I have two suggested norms for law professors who tweet: First, law
professors should assume that, each time they tweet about a legal issue, they
are making an implicit claim to expertise about that issue. Second, professors
who participate on Twitter should keep in mind that they are part of a profession
that is committed to promoting reasoned debate. These norms will not correct
all of the Twitter vices identified in this Essay—they are far too modest to do
that. But my hope is that, in proposing relatively modest norms, they are more
likely to be accepted by other professors.
Importantly, these suggested norms are directed only at those who publicly
identify themselves as law professors on Twitter. A law professor whose
Twitter profile and tweets do not identify her as a law professor is “tweeting in
her personal capacity” and should feel free to tweet only with her own
reputation and interests in mind. And a law professor’s posts on other nonpublicly available social media, such as Facebook, are also more appropriately
considered personal.
Perhaps more importantly, I am offering these norms as a starting point for
discussion. There are hundreds of law professors on Twitter, and each of them
has their own approach and priorities.54 I know that at least some law professors
disagree with the norms that I am suggesting. Some law professors see Twitter
primarily as a social platform, and thus they question why they should have to
maintain a professional persona on it.55 Others insist that lawyers are
51. See Paul Horwitz, The Small and Vast Difference Between Two Op-Eds, PRAWFSBLAWG
(Aug. 25, 2017), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/08/the-small-and-vast-differencebetween-two-op-eds.html [https://perma.cc/JV7U-62UK] (raising questions about how law professors’
novel arguments ought to be presented in op-eds).
52. Lee Fang, The Scholars Who Shill for Wall Street, NATION (Oct. 23, 2013),
https://www.thenation.com/article/scholars-who-shill-wall-street/
[https://perma.cc/W2VP-F4VT]
(raising concerns about a law professor who had testified about financial legislation without disclosing
his outside funding).
53. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 253; Frost, supra note 10, at 148 (discussing the conditions
under which law professors ought to sign amicus briefs).
54. See, e.g., Will Baude, Simple Principles for Tweeting Well, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 2,
2018,
3:35
PM),
http://reason.com/volokh/2018/03/02/simple-principles-for-tweeting-well
[https://perma.cc/73FA-D483]; Josh Blackman, My Rules for Twitter, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Jan.
15, 2018), http://joshblackman.com/blog/?s=rules+for+twitter.
55. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge (@ProfBainbridge), TWITTER (Dec. 31, 2017, 10:44 PM),
https://twitter.com/ProfBainbridge/status/947690062740721664 [https://perma.cc/F744-8VBJ] (“I
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generalists, and thus law professors on Twitter should not feel constrained to
their areas of expertise.56 But while I may be unable to convince all law
professors that these norms are desirable, so long as a significant number of us
agree on these norms, then they can go a long way towards ensuring that the
virtues of Twitter for a legal academic are not overwhelmed by its vices.
1. Assume you are claiming expertise when you tweet about issues related to
law
Law professors who identify themselves as law professors on their Twitter
profiles are making a representation to the public. They are identifying
themselves as an expert on legal issues. Thus, a person who identifies herself
as a law professor on Twitter should assume that others will interpret that
identification as a claim to expertise. That claim to expertise lurks in the
background of all tweets on legal topics.
An implicit claim to expertise does not necessarily mean that a law
professor should only tweet in areas where she is an expert. Because Twitter is
populated by many people who know very little about the law, a law professor
will often be able to clarify or dispute a legal issue that is being
mischaracterized by others, even if that issue is outside of her core area of
expertise. Law professors of all fields are experts in teaching others how to
“think like a lawyer.” And so law professors may have expertise in pointing
out logical flaws in the reasoning of others, even when that reasoning isn’t
necessarily about a legal issue. But law professors should be careful when
offering to clarify a legal misunderstanding outside of their field, or when
disputing the logic in the non-legal claims of others. Non-expert law professors
need not remain silent; but they should make clear that they are not claiming
expertise when they tweet about those matters. Put differently, when tweeting
on legal issues outside of their area of expertise, law professors should take care
to dispel the implicit claim to expertise created by their self-identification as a
law professor.
Law professors can tweet in ways that dispel the implicit claim of expertise.
They can, most obviously, disclaim expertise in a tweet itself. Imagine, for

guess I disagree with the premise. For me, at least, Twitter is mainly recreational. And political. And
venting. It’s not a venue where I go for reasoned discourse about the law. And it’s not a place to look
for anyone speaking with authority. It’s a saloon not a French salon.”).
56. See, e.g., David Herzig (@professortax), TWITTER (Jan. 1, 2018, 11:28 AM),
https://twitter.com/professortax/status/947882310539628545 [https://perma.cc/F75E-GJ8G] (“[N]ot
sure why norm would be I can only comment on tax law. I can file a lawsuit as a lawyer for any area
of law as long as I’m willing to do leg work. I can go to AALS and pontificate on anything. Why is
norm different here?”).
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example, if a non-lawyer tweeted that, because a winning candidate for political
office had accepted inappropriate campaign contributions, a new election
should be held. I would feel comfortable tweeting “I’m not an election law
expert, but that’s not how the law deals with campaign finance violations.”
Another way to dispel the implicit claim of expertise is to tweet in ways
that do not appear to be premised on a claim of personal expertise. Examples
of tweets that are not premised on personal expertise include tweeting links to
cases or to the scholarship or non-scholarly writings of those who are experts.
For example, I am not an expert on Fourth Amendment searches.57 But if an
event in the news implicated the constitutionality of a search, I would feel quite
comfortable tweeting a link to a blog post by a law professor who is a Fourth
Amendment expert and noting that the professor’s analysis seems sound.
Law professors can also dispel the background presumption of expertise by
framing their “takes” on newsworthy issues as questions, rather than as
affirmative opinions. If, for example, a public figure appears to have said
something that seems to be an incorrect statement of First Amendment law, I
should not tweet a statement that takes a definitive stance on the First
Amendment because I am not an expert in the field. But it would be entirely
appropriate for me to tweet a quote of the statement and to ask how that
statement can be squared with a particular Supreme Court case or a particular
constitutional principle. Such a tweet raises a legal issue, and it expresses
skepticism; but it also signals that I do not have a definitive answer to the
question that I have raised.58
In response to an earlier version of this Essay, some law professors have
argued that their implicit claim to expertise is limited to areas that they
specifically identify in their Twitter bios.59 For example, my Twitter bio
identifies me as a “[c]riminal law professor at the University of North
Carolina.” Thus, according to this argument, if I tweeted about the First
Amendment or election law, there would be no background claim to expertise
implicit in those tweets.
I disagree. For one thing, some law professors do not list areas of expertise
in their bios; they just identify as law professors. For another, people without
57. I have taught Fourth Amendment issues many times, but I do not write on the topic.
58. Framing non-expert thoughts as questions also has added benefits: It avoids embarrassment
if a law professor is wrong about something, and it can make disagreement seem more polite.
59. E.g., Michael Morley (@michaelmorley11), TWITTER (Mar. 20, 2018, 12:11 PM),
https://twitter.com/michaelmorley11/status/976144214496088065 [https://perma.cc/UA6D-YBCJ]
(noting “disagreement with [the] premise that, by tweeting as a law professor, I am presumptively
implicitly claiming expertise in the subject matter of my tweets. I have a general background in law,
but claim some degree of expertise only in areas listed in my bio.”).
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legal training may not be able to understand whether a particular area listed in
a professor’s bio makes that person an “expert” on a particular topic. For
example, some law professors list “public law” as an area of expertise in their
bios.60 Most non-lawyers do not know what “public law” means. Other law
professors list “constitutional law” or “constitutional theory” in their bios.
Many non-lawyers that I know think that the Constitution (rather than statutes,
regulations, or the common law) is the primary source of law in the United
States. And so they are likely to read such a bio as claiming expertise in
absolutely everything having to do with law.
To be clear, the implicit claim to expertise does not extend to everything
that a law professor posts on Twitter. A law professor has no implicit claim to
expertise about sporting events, celebrity culture, or other obviously non-legal
subjects just by virtue of the fact that they self-identify as a law professor on
Twitter.61 The implicit claim to expertise arises only in tweets related to legal
issues.
One might question whether law professors’ tweets about political issues
also carry an implicit claim to expertise.62 After all, it is often difficult to
disentangle law from politics (and vice versa). Take, for example, a law
professor who tweeted that a particular presidential action should or should not
lead to impeachment. Whether impeachment is warranted is both a legal and a
political question, and so it may be unclear whether the professor is making a
legal statement—in which case the implicit claim is present—or a political
statement—in which case it likely is not. Reasonable minds could differ on this
issue, but I believe that, to the extent that a law professor’s tweet on a political
issue could be viewed as a tweet on a legal issue, then she should err on the side
of caution and assume that there’s an implicit claim of expertise.
To be sure, assuming an implicit claim to expertise can be burdensome, and
it may lead law professors to tweet less outside of their areas of expertise. After
all, a tweet that is framed as a question or that includes a disclaimer of expertise
is hardly going to be thought pithy and retweeted widely. And so some

60. For example, Einer Elhauge identifies himself in his Twitter bio as “Harvard Law Professor,
antitrust economist, and scholar focused on antitrust, contracts, health law policy, and public law.”
Einer Elhauge (@elhauge), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/elhauge [https://perma.cc/7ARY-KRV2].
(last visited Mar. 28, 2018). He is not the only law professor to use the “public law” moniker. See
TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/search?f=users&vertical=default&q=public%20law&src=typd
[https://perma.cc/5HWE-ZFB7] (last visited Mar. 28, 2018).
61. Importantly, law professors are often experts in things other than law. Many have advanced
degrees in other fields, non-legal work experience, and similar backgrounds and experiences. But
identifying as a law professor does not implicate other potential areas of expertise.
62. There is a related, but separate question, about whether law professors ought to refrain from
making purely political statements while identifying as law professors. That question is much bigger
than this particular essay, and I do not take it up here.
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professors may find it is simply not worth tweeting on newsworthy topics
outside their area of expertise. I’m not sure that is a bad thing.
2. Help promote (or at least do not undermine) reasoned debate
Whenever law professors express ideas, at least some people will disagree
with them. Disagreement is nothing new to law professors. We often disagree
with judges or other professors in our scholarship. And when we publish our
own scholarship or speak at conferences and workshops, people often disagree
with us. Engaging with those who disagree with us is part of our job as law
professors.
Using Twitter to engage with opposing views is not easy. The character
limits lead many Twitter users to be abrupt. Those same limits also pose a
challenge for offering explanations, rather than simply conclusions. Some
people appear to use Twitter primarily as a platform to inflame the passions of
others,63 while others proudly proclaim that their tweets are meant to be
“snarky.”64 Dealing with abrasive and downright rude people does not lead a
person to be calm, cool, or collected.
Even though the Twitter platform makes civil disagreement more difficult,
law professors should strive to uphold the same norms of reasoned debate that
we have in our disagreements about scholarship. When disagreeing about ideas
in scholarship, law professors are often able to do so in a professional manner.65
They identify the precise grounds of debate, concede when appropriate, and
keep the discussion focused on the substance of the arguments. Twitter
disagreements should follow the same form. A law professor should ask
herself, before tweeting, whether the tone and the content of her disagreement
are appropriate given that she publicly identified herself as a law professor.
One might wonder why a law professor ought to have a special obligation
to promote reasoned debate. What is it about law professors—as opposed to
dentists, accountants, or elementary school teachers—that should require them
to maintain a civil tone on Twitter? The difference is that one of the major
63. This phenomenon is so common that the internet has developed a slang term to refer to such
people: troll. A troll is a person who purposefully posts offensive comments in order to antagonize
others.
See
Internet
Troll,
URBAN
DICTIONARY,
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Internet%20Troll
[https://perma.cc/K3VYGX9G] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
64. The term “snarky” appears to mean something roughly approximating sarcastic cynicism or
rudely critical—and yet people (even law professors) seem to claim the characteristic as a badge of
honor. See Snarky, URBAN DICTIONARY, https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=snarky
[https://perma.cc/PP6S-KZ7S] (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
65. I say “often” because not all law professors are equally gracious during substantive
disputes. Occasionally, a professor’s disagreement at a conference, workshop, or in published work
can be unprofessional or rude.
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skills we aim to teach our students in law school is to be able to argue
dispassionately about controversial topics. Our ability to disagree civilly with
one another about our scholarship is not simple professionalism; it is part of
what helps set legal thinkers apart from those without legal training.
Indeed, in a recent article for Time Magazine, Yale Law School Dean
Heather Gerken credited the training that law students receive as the reason we
have not seen the same sort of efforts to limit free speech at law schools as we
have seen elsewhere on University campuses:
In law schools we don’t just teach our students to know the
weaknesses in their own arguments. We demand that they
imaginatively and sympathetically reconstruct the best
argument on the other side. From the first day in class, students
must defend an argument they don’t believe or pretend to be a
judge whose values they dislike. Every professor I know
assigns cases that vindicate the side she favors—then brutally
dismantles their reasoning. Lawyers learn to see the world as
their opponents do, and nothing is more humbling than that.
We teach students that even the grandest principles have limits.
The day you really become a lawyer is the day you realize that
the law doesn’t—and shouldn’t—match everything you
believe. The litigation system is premised on the hope that
truth will emerge if we ensure that everyone has a chance to
have her say.66
Given that law schools pride themselves on teaching their students “how to
go to war without turning the other side into an enemy,”67 we should expect law
professors to model that skill in their public discourse. The ability to engage in
reasoned debate is part of our shared identity as legal academics.
That isn't to say that professors shouldn't be able to express opinions or
strong feelings on Twitter. But rather, that when they are on Twitter they
shouldn’t advocate in favor of or against ideas in a fashion that is incompatible
with reasoned debate. They should speak in good faith, address others’
arguments on the merits, criticize arguments and actions rather than resorting
to personal attacks, and generally try to avoid the over-the-top invective that
often passes for public discourse in 2018.68
66. Heather Gerken, Dean of Yale Law School: Campus Free Speech Is Not Up For Debate,
TIME (July 13, 2017), http://time.com/4856225/law-school-free-speech/ [https://perma.cc/7GHSHRHG].
67. Id.
68. Anthony M. Kries (@AnthonyMKreis), TWITTER (Mar. 20, 2018, 11:01 AM),
https://twitter.com/AnthonyMKreis/status/976126686667378689
[https://perma.cc/BNK3-95D3]
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***
Twitter can be a useful platform for law professors. But it also poses a
number of challenges. Many law professors whom I admire avoid the platform
all together; several others tweet, but express great ambivalence about doing
so.69 The avoidance and ambivalence is attributable, at least in part, to the
problems with the platform I’ve addressed here.
But if the more circumspect and intellectually scrupulous law professors
stay off Twitter, that is not necessarily good for the legal academy as a whole.
Twitter may be a passing fad. But right now it is a major platform by which
the general public is exposed to law professors. The law professors who are the
most active on Twitter are, in a very real sense, the public face of the legal
academy for a large segment of the country. That is why the rest of the legal
academy should take an interest in setting norms for the platform.

(suggesting that law professors ought to “publish content that's civil/tasteful/good-natured befitting of
the profession and is a good model for others, esp[ecially] students.”).
69. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 4 (noting that Twitter often does not “allow for circumspect,
reasoned, dispassionate analysis” and expressing concern that Twitter results in lost academic
credibility); Horwitz, supra note 51 (“For my sins, I have become more active on Twitter lately.”);
Derek T. Muller, The Rise and Fall of my Use of Twitter, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY (Jan. 15, 2018),
http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2018/1/the-rise-and-fall-of-my-use-of-twitter
[https://perma.cc/ZP36-DYSH] (“[O]ver time, I found that these benefits has lost much of their appeal,
and the cost-benefit analysis has moved me away from using Twitter.”); Posner, supra note 41
(characterizing Twitter as “a black hole of value-destroying technology for all concerned”).

